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Among climate scientists, there is no longer any serious debate about whether greenhouse gas 
emissions from human activity are altering the earth’s climate.  There is also a broad consensus on 
two issues related to reducing emissions.  First, developing countries must be full participants in 
global emissions control, because they will be most heavily impacted by global warming, and 
because they are rapidly approaching parity with developed countries in the scale of their emissions.  
Second, efficient emissions control will require carbon pricing via market-based instruments (charges 
or cap-and-trade).  These points of consensus are sufficient to establish a clear way forward, despite 
continued disagreements over the choice of specific instrument and the appropriate carbon charge 
level.  Since all market-based systems that regulate emissions sources require the same emissions 
information, the international community should immediately establish an institution mandated to 
collect, verify and publicly disclose information about emissions from all significant global carbon 
sources.  Its mandate should extend to best-practice estimation and disclosure of emissions sources 
in countries that initially refuse to participate.  This institution will serve four purposes.  First, it will 
lay the necessary foundation for implementing any market-based system of emissions source 
regulation.  Second, it will provide an excellent credibility test, since a country’s acceptance of full 
disclosure will signal its true willingness to participate in globally-efficient emissions reduction.  
Third, global public disclosure will itself reduce carbon emissions, by focusing stakeholder pressure 
on major emitters and providing reputational rewards for clean producers.  Fourth, disclosure will 
make it very hard to cheat once market-based instruments are implemented.  This will be essential for 
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Levine, Lawrence MacDonald, Nabiel Makarim, Sheoli Pargal, David Roodman, Zmarak 
Shalizi, David Shaman, Andrew Steer, Tom Tietenberg, Kevin Ummel, Hua Wang, Dave 
Witzel and many other colleagues.  The author is responsible for any remaining errors of 
fact or interpretation. 1.  Introduction 
 
Among climate scientists, there is no longer any serious debate about whether 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from human activity are altering the earth’s climate.  
According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC IV, 2007), the likelihood of this effect is over 90%.  Remaining debate in 
the scientific literature focuses on the size, timing and impact of global warming, not on 
its existence.  Among social scientists and policymakers, another important debate 
focuses on appropriate measures to reduce emissions, accelerate development and 
diffusion of clean technologies, and support adaptation to the impacts of unavoidable 
climate change.  A critical part of this debate has focused on the double-edged 
predicament faced by the billions who remain poor.  If their societies ignore climate 
change, it may undermine the development process because global warming will have its 
heaviest impact on the South.  If the South commits to carbon limits, on the other hand, 
the associated costs will be significant.  This has created a crisis in North-South relations, 
as the South has seized on the idea that greenhouse emissions are a Northern problem that 
the North must solve, while the South remains free to overcome poverty without 
worrying about carbon emissions limits.  Unfortunately, new research shows that this 
view is both incorrect and dangerous for the South, because its own accumulating 
emissions would already be sufficient to catalyze a climate crisis without any emissions 
from the North (Wheeler and Ummel, 2007).  The lesson of this research is clear:  Global 
emissions are a global problem, and everyone must be at the table to determine 
appropriate policies for reducing them.   
  1The debate continues on appropriate measures to promote reduced emissions, clean 
technology development, clean technology diffusion, and adaptation to global warming.  
This paper focuses on the debate about regulation of carbon emissions sources:  the 
contending positions on regulatory instruments and carbon pricing, the underlying points 
of agreement, and the implications for global policy.  Section 2 shows why positions 
remain widely divergent on the scale, timing and stringency of needed measures to limit 
emissions.  Section 3 discusses the regulatory options, while Section 4 identifies the 
emergent policy consensus and makes concrete suggestions for global action.  Section 5 
summarizes and concludes the paper.    
2.  The Debate Over Carbon Emissions Regulation 
The international community has recently awakened to the possible existence of a 
critical threshold: an atmospheric CO2 concentration, perhaps as low as 450 parts per 
million volume (ppm), beyond which large and irreversible damage from global warming 
is very likely.
1  But we are already very late in the game.  By mid-2007, the atmospheric 
concentration had increased from its pre-industrial level, about 280 ppm, to 386 ppm.  
Under widely-varying assumptions in current forecast scenarios (IPCC SRES, 2000),
2 we 
will almost certainly reach 450 ppm within 30 years without serious efforts to limit 
emissions.  Staying under this threshold, or even within limits 100-200 ppm higher, will 
involve very rapid global adjustment, with unprecedented international coordination of 
efforts and a very strong focus on cost-effective measures.   
Although there is a global consensus for action, contention over appropriate 
measures remains serious because of disagreements about the timing and scale of future 
                                                 
1  CO2 is the primary greenhouse gas. 
2  Scenario descriptions are available online at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/089.htm. 
  2climate change, the severity of its impacts, the choice of appropriate policy instruments, 
and the size of the incentives needed to promote needed reductions in carbon emissions. 
Two debates propel the scientific controversy.  The first is about climatic 
adjustment systems that are not completely understood.  These include thermal 
absorption by the oceans; associated thermal convection currents at global scale; 
absorption and expulsion of carbon by terrestrial sinks; changing absorption of solar 
radiation as melting polar ice yields darker waters and land masses; radiation-blocking by 
cloud formations; and changes in carbon fixation by living biomass.  The second debate 
is about the significance of enormous, potentially-unstable terrestrial and marine carbon 
deposits.  A frequently-cited example is the carbon sequestered in permafrost regions, 
which will escape into the atmosphere if global warming continues (Zimov et al., 2006).  
Another is the carbon sequestered in the deep oceans, which may be expelled into the 
atmosphere as global warming affects deep-sea circulation.  Recent research suggests that 
such an expulsion occurred during the rapid temperature rise at the end of the most recent 
ice age (Marchitto et al., 2007). 
These factors make it difficult to forecast the timing and severity of global 
warming.  Most climate scientists also believe that at least three elements of instability – 
icecap melting, permafrost carbon and deep-ocean carbon – are so large that they 
determine thresholds beyond which positive feedbacks would cause the atmospheric 
GHG concentration and temperature to increase rapidly over some range.  Although 
scientists disagree about the timing of such “tipping” phenomena, few doubt that 
triggering them would have catastrophic implications because global society could not 
adjust rapidly enough to avoid enormous damage.   
  3The dramatic tension here is supplied by three critical elements: Most climate-
change impacts will be experienced by future generations; there is a real possibility that 
unrestricted emissions will precipitate a climate catastrophe at some point in the future; 
and massive inertia in the global climate system
3 means that protecting future generations 
requires costly emissions control now.  These elements have set the stage for heated 
debates among social scientists and policymakers about the timing and stringency of 
carbon emissions limitation.    
Intergenerational Distribution 
 
Economists continue to argue about the appropriate social discount rate (SDR) – the 
weight that we should apply to our descendants’ welfare in making benefit-cost 
decisions.  This is extremely important for climate change policy, which must weigh 
large emissions control costs in the present against benefits that will accrue to people in 
the distant future.  In brief, the SDR has two components.  The first is a “pure” social rate 
of time preference, which reflects the response to the following values question:  If we 
know that our grandchildren’s material status will be the same as our own, should we 
count their welfare equally with our own in making decisions about climate change 
policy?  If the answer is yes, or nearly yes, then we should make significant sacrifices 
now to prevent adverse impacts on our grandchildren.  If, on the other hand, we discount 
the fortunes of succeeding generations, then we will be inclined to let them fend for 
themselves.  We will accept little or no sacrifice of consumption now to insure our 
successors against losses a century or two hence.   
                                                 
3 This inertia arises from the long duration of carbon emissions in the atmosphere, as well as the positive-
feedback systems mentioned above.  
  4The second component of the SDR reflects our assumptions about future progress.  
If world economic growth and technical progress continue at historical rates, and are not 
undermined by global warming itself,  then our grandchildren will be far richer and better 
endowed with technical options than we are.  In this case, in fairness, it makes sense for 
us to minimize our sacrifices now, even if we value future generations’ welfare the same 
as our own. 
Much of the recent controversy over climate change policy among economists 
reflects different views about the appropriate SDR.  The Stern Review (2006) adopts a 
very low SDR, tilting the benefit-cost calculus strongly in favor of future generations, 
while Nordhaus (2007a,b) and others advocate a much higher SDR.  Quiggin (2006) 




A previous section described several “tipping” scenarios that would have 
irreversible and potentially-catastrophic effects.  Scientists can attach probabilities to 
such threshold effects, but they are inevitably somewhat arbitrary.  Examples include 
disintegration of the polar ice sheets within decades rather than centuries, drowning the 
world’s coastal cities and infrastructure before there is time to adapt; shutdown of the 
Gulf Stream, which would make Europe’s climate much more like Canada’s; and an 
upsurge of catastrophic damage from violent “superstorms”.  We would undoubtedly 
invest heavily to avoid such catastrophes if we believed they were imminent.  When they 
are deferred to the more distant future, however, the calculus becomes murkier. 
  5The Benefits and Costs of Carbon Emissions Control 
 
The Fourth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 
IV, 2007) acknowledges the possibility of threshold effects, but considers the science 
insufficient to incorporate them explicitly.  Stern (2006) incorporates such effects, and 
the result is a strong tilt toward stringent (and costly) emissions control policy.  Lomborg 
(2007) does not incorporate them, and this moderates his conclusions about appropriate 
stringency.  While criticizing Lomborg’s approach, Dasgupta (2007) argues that 
traditional benefit-cost analysis is ill-equipped to incorporate climate thresholds in any 
case. 
Stern (2006), Lomborg (2007) and Nordhaus (2007a,b) have estimated the costs 
associated with various emissions targets.
4  Stern and Lomborg focus on the cost of 
limiting the atmospheric CO2 concentration to approximately 550 ppm.  Lomborg 
estimates the cost at approximately $52 billion annually, or 0.11% of global income,
5 
while Stern estimates the cost at 1% of income.  Nordhaus (2007b) quantifies the costs 
associated with a variety of targets, using a social discount rate that is considerably 
higher than Stern’s.  Table 1 displays his results which, given his modeling assumptions, 
show that when emissions restrictions are tightened, the costs increase faster than the 
benefits.  Lowering the atmospheric concentration limit from 700 ppm to 420 ppm, for 
example, increases discounted benefits (avoided damages) by $7.4 trillion and increases 
discounted emissions control costs by $25 trillion.  While net benefits are positive for the 
                                                 
4 Carbon emissions from land-clearing are a very important source of global warming.  However, the cost 
calculations reported in this section focus principally on industrial emissions, primarily from fossil fuel 
combustion.  Introduction of population and deforestation effects generally relies on the assumption that the 
relevant variables change exogenously.  For example, Nordhaus (2007b) imposes a logistic function on 
world population, roughly consistent with mid-range UN projections, that stabilizes global population at 
around 8.5 billion.   
5 Based on global GDP of $48.2 trillion (World Bank, 2006) 
  6700 ppm limit relative to the no-control baseline (2.4 benefit/cost ratio), the converse is 
true for the 420 ppm limit (.5 benefit/cost ratio).  The same message about incremental 
benefits and costs recurs throughout Table 1, which includes four temperature-increase 
limits, variations on the Kyoto Protocol, one version of the Stern Review results, and a 
recent proposal for rapid emissions reduction by Al Gore. 
At Nordhaus’ social discount rate, which tilts results more strongly toward the 
present than the Stern rate, near-term costs loom much larger than long-term benefits 
when sharp omissions reductions in the near future are needed to reach a target.  As Table 
1 shows, Nordhaus’ approach yields negative net benefits (benefit/cost ratios less than 1) 
for the stringent programs of Stern and Gore when they are compared to the baseline case 
(no explicit emissions control).  Of course, Stern and Gore do not agree with Nordhaus’s 
conclusions, principally because they dispute his assumptions about the social discount 




Nordhaus (2007b), Stern (2006) and others have estimated the carbon charges (or 
auctioned permit prices under cap-and-trade) that are consistent with different levels of 
emissions control.  The underlying economic logic supports a charge that rises over time.  
At present, most damages are in the relatively distant future and there are plentiful high-
return opportunities for conventional investment.  Investment should become more 
intensive in emissions reduction as climate-related damage rises, and rising charges will 
provide the requisite incentive to reduce emissions.  The optimal “ramp” for charges 
depends on factors such as the discount rate, abatement costs, the potential for 
                                                 
6  The stakes are clarified by Nordhaus himself, who notes that his cost estimate for Stern (1.5% of income) 
is 50% higher than Stern’s own estimate. 
  7technological learning, and the scale and irreversibility of damage from climate change 
(Nordhaus, 2007a).  As we have seen, these factors remain contentious.  It is therefore 
not surprising that different studies establish very different ramps.  Nordhaus’ preferred 
path begins at about $8/ton of CO2, rising to about $23/ton by 2050.  Stern’s initial 
charge is 10 times higher -- $82/ton – and his ramp is steeper.  IPCC IV (2007) cites a 
variety of studies whose initial values average $12/ton, distributed across a range from 
$3-$95/ton. 
We are clearly a long way from consensus on pricing carbon, but it is critical to 
make a start, with all countries participating if possible.  Even if initial carbon charges are 
at the modest end of the range, the revenue implications are significant.  Nordhaus’ initial 
charge ($8 per ton of CO2), if applied to current Northern CO2 emissions (16.5 Gt) 
uniformly, would generate over $130 billion.  Some of this revenue could be earmarked 
for financing clean-technology R&D, rapid adoption of clean technology by developing 
countries, and assistance to those countries for adapting to the global warming that is 
already inevitable.  With such a revenue base, the annual clean-energy R&D budget 
recommended by Lomborg (2007) -- $25 billion -- could easily be financed.
7
To summarize, policy analysts continue to disagree about the timing and stringency 
of regulation because they have different perspectives on climate dynamics, the social 
discount rate, risk, and the implications of benefit/cost assessment.  However, almost all 
contenders agree that some form of global emissions regulation is necessary.  In addition, 
most agree that efficient emissions reduction requires implementation of a market-based 
                                                 
7  From a public finance perspective, it would be preferable to separate clean technology development 
decisions from revenues generated by emissions regulation.  In practice (particularly in the US), however, 
earmarking is often the only way to allay public resistance to new charges or taxes. 
  8instrument to regulate emissions sources – carbon charges, cap-and-trade, or some 
combination of the two.
8   
3.  Instruments for Emissions Regulation 
 
3.1  Three Waves of Regulatory Development 
Creating effective incentives for carbon reduction will require some form of 
emissions regulation, which has developed in three “waves” since the 1960’s (Wheeler et 
al., 2000; Tietenberg and Wheeler, 2001).  In the first wave, until the 1980’s for most 
countries, the focus was solely on “command and control” regulation.  Polluters were 
given fixed regulatory limits (either quantities, waste-stream intensities, or required 
technology installations), and subjected to escalating penalties as they progressively 
exceeded these limits.  While this has remained the dominant approach to pollution 
regulation in most countries, its inherent inefficiency has been aptly criticized on several 
grounds:  It does nothing to reward polluters who reduce emissions beyond compliance 
norms, it pays no attention to differences in pollution control costs, and it frequently 
entails burdensome technical specifications that must be constantly updated.   
In reaction, the second wave focused on market-based regulatory instruments.  
Broadly, these instruments are separated into two classes.  Pollution charges impose a 
charge on each unit of pollution and leave polluters free to decide how much to pollute.  
Charges have desirable efficiency properties, since they enable polluters to treat the 
environment as another “priced input” and optimize accordingly.  They have achieved 
acceptance in some countries, particularly for water pollutants.  However, their influence 
                                                 
8  Because it focuses on regulation of emissions sources (e.g., power plants, cement plants), this paper does 
not consider market-based regulation of high-carbon production inputs such as coal.  Direct, market-based 
regulation of coal may warrant serious consideration for two main reasons:  Coal combustion is a huge 
source of carbon emissions, and coal is a high-bulk commodity that is easily tracked to the mines that 
produce it. 
  9in many societies has remained limited because of inevitable uncertainty about the 
relationship between the charge and polluters’ response.  For dangerous pollutants, any 
given charge may prove insufficient to induce collective pollution reduction sufficient to 
reduce the hazard to a tolerable level.  In principle, this can be handled through constant 
monitoring of the response, and adjustment of the charge to move total pollution to the 
desired level (Baumol and Oates, 1971).  In practice, such adjustment has proven difficult 
because most political systems do not easily accommodate this kind of information-
driven flexibility. 
The other market-based approach addresses uncertainty about total pollution by 
imposing an overall limit on emissions, distributing unit emissions permits by some 
means, and then allowing polluters to buy and sell the permits as conditions warrant.  
Typically, marketable permit (or cap-and-trade) systems begin by accepting current total 
pollution and allocating permits to polluters in proportion to their emissions.  From an 
efficiency perspective it would be far better to auction the permits, just as governments 
auction broadcast spectrum, but this has rarely happened in the case of pollution.  After 
initial permits are issued, total allowable pollution is periodically reduced, and polluters 
are allowed to trade permits as their economic circumstances warrant.  Over time, total 
pollution falls and economic efficiency is enhanced by the permits market.  This 
approach is no panacea, however.  Resolution of uncertainty about total pollution creates 
uncertainty about the price of polluting.  This is the price of a unit emissions permit, 
which will vary over time in a complex trading system.  Permit prices may prove 
inordinately high if overall reductions are too ambitious.  In addition, marketable permit 
  10systems require the creation of a new and complex trading institution that requires 
constant oversight.   
In response to such difficulties, a third wave of regulation emerged in the 1990’s.  
The third wave is public disclosure, in which governments require firms to reveal their 
emissions to the public.  Public disclosure systems first emerged to address toxic 
pollution, because the sheer number of toxic pollutants exceeded the capacity of formal 
regulatory systems.  Then disclosure systems spread to other pollutants, particularly in 
developing countries, as their advantages became apparent.  First, their transparency and 
relative simplicity enhance their appeal in the weak institutional environments that 
characterize many developing countries.  Second, they introduce more flexibility than 
formal regulatory systems, by substituting multiple agents with multiple incentives for a 
single formal regulatory agent.  Whatever the formal requirement (command-and-control 
regulation, tradable permit price, unit pollution charge), many stakeholders will prefer 
environmental performance better than the requirement.  Public disclosure empowers 
these stakeholders to make their influence felt through a variety of market and non-
market channels (Wheeler et al., 2000; Tietenberg and Wheeler, 2001).  Third, public 
disclosure demonstrably works.  In both developing and developed countries, disclosure 
of plant-level pollution has led to rapid, significant reduction of pollution from many 
facilities (Dasgupta, Wang and Wheeler, 2005).   
3.2  Public Disclosure in Developing Countries 
Public disclosure has been particularly effective in developing countries, which will 
play an essential role in limiting global carbon emissions.  Their experience with 
regulating local air and water pollutants provides a useful context for thinking about 
  11carbon emissions regulation.  Many developing-country environmental agencies began 
regulating pollution in the 1980’s and ‘90’s.  Although most agencies are equipped to set 
legal standards for maximum allowable emissions levels, monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with these standards is often hindered by scarcity of technical personnel, 
weak information management, and corruption.  In response, developing-country 
regulators have begun opting for second- and third-wave regulation.  Some have turned to 
financial incentives by charging polluters for every unit of their emissions.  Recent 
experiences with pollution charges in Colombia, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines 
have shown that managers opt for serious pollution control when they face regular 
payments for emissions (Wheeler et al., 2000). 
Many agencies have also opted for public disclosure, which discourages corruption; 
strengthens enforcement through community and market pressure on polluters; and 
provides reputational rewards for clean firms.  For example, Indonesia’s environment 
ministry initiated its Program for Pollution Control Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) in 
1994.  Successful implementation of PROPER (Afsah, Blackman and Ratunanda, 2000) 
has inspired similar programs in the Philippines (EcoWatch), China (GreenWatch – 
Wang and Wheeler, 2004), Vietnam (Environmental Information Disclosure), and India.  
Table 2 provides summary evidence on the impacts of the disclosure programs in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, China, and Vietnam.  In all four countries, public disclosure 
was intended to strengthen, but not replace, weak conventional regulatory systems.  The 
tabulated results suggest that initial concerns about compliance were well-founded.  
Before disclosure, compliance rates were 37% in Indonesia, 8% in Philippines, 10% in 
Vietnam, 75% in Zhenjiang, China and 23% in Hohhot, China.  After disclosure, the 
  12compliance rate increased by 24% in Indonesia, 50% in Philippines, 14% in Vietnam, 
10% in Zhenjiang, China (from a high base), and 39% in Hohhot, China.  In light of the 
evident regulatory problems in all four countries, these improvements suggest that public 
disclosure had a very significant effect on reducing pollution. 
4.  Regulating Global Carbon Emissions 
Which regulatory approach will work best for reducing carbon emissions?  Both 
pollution charges and tradable permits have strong partisans; debate about their relative 
merits continues, along with contention over the appropriate carbon price level. But these 
disagreements should not be permitted to mask two fundamental points of agreement:  
The global consensus supports some level of carbon pricing, established by some form of 
market-based instrument for regulation of carbon emissions sources.  This consensus is 
highly significant for policy, because all forms of market-based emissions source 
regulation require the same information on carbon emissions for credible monitoring and 
enforcement.  The first stop toward efficient global regulation of this type is therefore 
clear:  Establishment of an audited global inventory of all significant carbon emissions 
sources, that will provide the common database for market-based regulation once it is 
established.
9   Setting up the inventory is a major challenge in itself, since it requires 
common measurement standards, reporting protocols for emissions sources, and technical 
assistance to firms’ managers and staff who will be charged with reporting emissions.  
An independent system for auditing emissions reports also has to be established.  These 
tasks will take years to complete, so they should begin immediately.  
                                                 
9  The same database is also necessary for command-and-control regulation. 
  13The next step toward efficient global regulation is also straightforward:  Once the 
global inventory is established, emissions from all sources should be reported to the 
public.  This is important for several reasons.  First, it provides an entry point for 
countries that accept the principle of global regulation, without imposing formal 
sanctions on polluters.  Second, disclosure is a necessary prelude to efficient carbon 
regulation.  For command-and-control or market-based instruments to work credibly in 
the global arena, they will have to operate in a transparent, audited information 
environment.  Starting disclosure now will work out the kinks in the information system, 
establish the principle of transparency, and develop generally-accepted emissions 
benchmarks for formal regulation.  Third, disclosure will activate many stakeholders who 
will, in turn, pressure polluters to reduce their emissions.  
After public disclosure is well-established, credible formal regulation can begin.  
Which system will be most feasible and desirable?
 10  To date, cap-and-trade systems 
have dominated the global discussion.  They have the advantages of precedent (the Kyoto 
Protocol uses cap-and-trade) and relative certainty in the determination of overall 
emissions, particularly if disclosure has established a credible public information base.  
However, global cap-and-trade raises the prospect of significant international financial 
transfers if the overall emissions limit is really binding.  The magnitudes are potentially 
large, and it seems unlikely that many national political systems could accommodate 
them very easily.  In addition, the global institution needed to administer a cap-and-trade 
system would inevitably be large, complex, and charged with brokering the exceptions 
that haunt systems which control quantities.   
                                                 
10 Cogent support for charges can be found in Mankiw (2007) and Nordhaus (2007c).  For useful 
assessments of the EU cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions, see Ellerman and Buchner (2007), 
Convery and Redmond (2007) and Kruger, et al. (2007). 
  14There is also the problem of initial permit allocation.  Auctions have proven 
difficult to implement, because existing polluters organize to fight them politically.  But 
giving initial permits to those polluters would reward them with a valuable property right 
and disadvantage newcomers.  In summary, a truly global cap-and-trade system seems 
problematic.  If operated efficiently, it could enforce an overall emissions reduction target 
but the resulting permit price could not be predicted with any accuracy.  Accordingly, a 
politically-acceptable cap-and-trade program will have to include rules for adjusting the 
supply of permits as the price response is revealed.
11   
Emissions charges have several appealing characteristics in this context.  First, they 
can be administered within each country on a fiscally-neutral basis.  Charge revenues can 
be used to reduce other taxes, some of which may be highly distortionary.  Second, 
charges don’t require the establishment of a complex institution to establish new property 
rights and monitor exchanges within the system.  Third, revenues accrue to society, while 
tradable permits that are distributed without auctions deliver the potential revenue 
streams to existing polluters.  Of course, the principal weakness of charge systems 
remains – their quantity effects are uncertain, and adjustments will be necessary as those 
effects become apparent.
12  And in some societies (particularly the US), there is a deep 
aversion to new taxes that might not be mollified by a guarantee of fiscal neutrality.  
Finally, at the global scale, a uniform charge system would collide with the same 
complexities that make a uniform cap-and-trade system problematic.  Countries with very 
                                                 
11 For discussion, see Olmstead and Stavins (2006), McKibbon and Wilcoxin (2002) and Pizer (2002). 
12 For elaboration of this approach as applied to conventional pollutants, see Baumol and Oates (1971). 
  15different initial conditions may simply refuse to accept a globally-uniform system that 
ignores the economic implications of those conditions.
13  
Given all these complexities, it seems likely that some countries will prefer charges, 
some will choose cap-and-trade, and some may choose inefficient quantity-based 
measures for political reasons (e.g., progressive elimination of coal-based power, through 
closure of mines, reduction of imports, and forced closure of coal-fired plants
14).  In this 
hybrid setting, international negotiations will probably focus on target emissions paths for 
participating countries.  Continued participation and at least rough compliance will be 
motivated by public pressure; threats of sanctions in various economic arenas; the threat 
of punitive damages in an evolving international judicial system; the risk of severe 
political turbulence from environmental disasters; and the risk that recalcitrants will be 
shunned by their traditional allies.   
Such a system will be far from perfect, but it would be unrealistic to expect a 
smoothly-functioning system in a world where country stakes in the climate-change 
problem are so diverse.  In any case, the first and second steps on the path forward – 
establishment and public disclosure of an emissions inventory -- are clear, doable and 
necessary for all that follows.  If the global community can accomplish these tasks  in the 
near future, it will be well-positioned to move toward market-based instruments. 
The EU, Canada and India have already established precedents for carbon 
emissions disclosure, by publishing audited emissions reports for large carbon emitters in 
                                                 
13 For example, Brazil’s energy sector relies heavily on hydropower and biofuels which have zero net 
carbon emissions, while the US energy sector is heavily dependent on carbon-intensive coal-fired plants.   
14  As noted in a previous footnote, market-based instruments could also be applied to coal itself, by 
auctioning permits to produce it, or by levying an emissions charge per ton produced.   
  16the manufacturing and power sectors.
15   Two NGO initiatives -- The Carbon Disclosure 
Project and The Global Reporting Initiative – have established guidelines and facilities 
for voluntary emissions disclosure by major emitters.  In November, 2007, the Center for 
Global Development will establish a comprehensive benchmark for global disclosure by 
launching CARMA (Carbon Monitoring for Action).  CARMA will focus on the power 
sector, the largest carbon emitter, by publishing an emissions inventory for 50,000+ 
power plants and 20,000+ power-producing companies.  It will disclose reported or 
estimated current emissions, emissions in 2000, and future emissions based on published 
capacity expansion plans.  This inventory, available online at www.carma.org as of 
November 14, will provide a complete downloadable database, updated quarterly, as well 
as tools for ranking and comparing power facilities, power companies, and geographic 
areas (countries, states/provinces, cities and, in the US, counties, congressional districts 
and zip codes).  For the many thousands of plants and companies that have yet to report 
their emissions publicly, CARMA will provide best-practice emissions estimates.  It will 
also invite non-reporting facilities and companies to submit audited emissions reports for 
publication.  
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have shown why policy analysts are still far from agreement on the 
appropriate price of carbon and the best market-based instrument for regulating carbon 
emissions.  But most accept the need to price carbon at some level, using some form of 
                                                 
15  The European Pollutant Emission Register is available online at  
http://eper.ec.europa.eu/eper/flashmap.asp.  The Register includes CO2 emissions reports for several 
hundred major emitters in the EU.  Environment Canada provides greenhouse gas emissions reports at 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/onlinedata/DataAndReports_e.cfm.  The Indian Power Ministry reports  
emissions at http://www.cea.nic.in/planning/c%20and%20e/Government%20of%20India%20website.htm. 
 
 
  17market-based regulation of carbon emissions sources.  And a growing consensus supports 
full inclusion of the South in global regulation, because its emissions alone are sufficient 
to catalyze a climate crisis.  Neither the North nor the South will escape serious global 
warming unless the other region is fully engaged.    
To lay the groundwork for comprehensive, efficient, market-based regulation, we 
recommend immediate establishment of an international institution mandated to collect, 
verify and publicly disclose information about emissions from all significant global 
carbon sources.  This institution could be housed within the UN system, as part of an 
existing organization or as a new entity.  It could also be established as an internationally-
chartered NGO, with UN oversight and auditing.  It will build on the general public-
information precedents established by the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP).  Its mandate should extend to best-practice estimation and disclosure of 
sources in countries that initially refuse to participate.   
The institution will serve four major purposes.  First, it will provide the emissions 
information necessary for implementing any market-based regulation of emissions 
sources.  Second, it will establish an excellent credibility test, since a country’s 
acceptance of carbon disclosure will signal its true willingness to participate in globally-
efficient regulation.  Third, global public disclosure will itself reduce carbon emissions, 
by focusing stakeholder pressure on major emitters and providing reputational rewards 
for clean producers.  Fourth, disclosure will make it very hard to cheat once market-based 
instruments are implemented.  This will be essential for preserving the credibility of an 
international agreement to limit emissions.  Establishing a global emissions inventory and 
  18disclosing it to the public are major tasks that will require years to implement.  The work 
should begin now, so the supporting information base and disclosure system will be 
operational when a global agreement is reached on carbon charges and/or cap-and-trade. 
The first essential step is establishment of a stakeholders’ working group that will 
determine the appropriate scope, institutional setting and operational protocols for global 
public disclosure of carbon emissions. 
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Table 1:  Benefit and Cost Estimates for Carbon Emissions Control 
    Relative to No Policies to Slow or Reverse Global Warming 
      













 $Trillion  (US  2005) 
Nordhaus/DICE Optimal
a 5.23 2.16  2.4 
       
GHG  Concentration  Limits       
420 ppm  12.60  27.20  0.5   
560 ppm  6.57  3.90  1.7   
700 ppm  5.24  2.16  2.4   
       
Temperature-increase limits       
  1.5 °C  12.60  27.03  0.5 
  2.0 °C  9.45  11.25  0.8 
  2.5 °C  7.22  5.24  1.4 
  3.0 °C  5.88  2.86  2.1 
       
  Kyoto  Protocol     
  With US
b 1.17 0.54   
 
2.2 
  Without US




d 6.54 5.82 
 
1.1 
     
  Stern Review discounting








g 17.63 0.44 
 
39.9 
Source: Nordhaus (2007b) 
 
a Yale DICE model:  Runs set to maximize the value of net economic consumption, assuming complete 
implementation efficiency and universal participation.  Time discounting at 1.5% pure time preference rate, 
plus utility elasticity of 2.0. 
b Incorporates the Kyoto Protocol emissions limits (at least 5% below 1990 levels) for 2008-2012 (all 
Kyoto Annex I countries, including the US); no emissions reductions in non-participating countries. 
c Same as above, without the US 
d Sequential entry of the US (2015), China (2020) and India (2030), with 50% emissions reductions within 
15 years.  Every region except Sub-Saharan Africa assumed to reduce emissions significantly by 2050.  
The result is a global emissions reduction rate of 40% from the baseline by 2050, and a global emissions 
level somewhat above the level in 1990. 
e Emissions reduction path is determined by the DICE model using the Stern social discount rate.  Then the 
model is re-run using this path, calculating benefits and costs with the standard DICE discount rate. 
f Global emissions control rate rises from 15% in 2010 to 90% in 2050; country participation rate rises from 
an initial 50% to 100% by 2050. 
g Emergence of a clean technology or energy source that can replace all fossil fuels at current costs. 
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Table 2:  Public Disclosure in Asian Developing Countries:   





























Source: Wheeler (2006) 
Country /  Factories by     Compliance 
Change 
Total Factories 
Rated  Program  Compliance Status  Compliance Status 
Indonesia  Non-
Compliant 
  % Non-
Compliant 
    
PROPER  Compliant  % Compliant 
  1995 92  54  63  37  146 
+24%  1997 57  89  39  61  146 
          
Philippines           EcoWatch 
  1997 48  4  92  8  52 
+50%  1998 19  26  42  58  45 
          
Vietnam           Hanoi  
  2001 45  5  90  10  50 
+14%  2002 38  12  76  24  50 
          
China   
GreenWatch        
Zhenjiang 
  1999 23  68  25  75  91 
+10%  2000 14  77  15  85  91 




      
Hohhot 
  1999 43  13  77  23  56 
+39%  2000 21  35  38  62  56 
  23